Introducing Exclusion Logic as a Deontic Logic

This paper introduces Exclusion Logic - a simple modal logic without negation or disjunction. We show that this logic has an efficient decision procedure. We describe how Exclusion Logic can be used as a deontic logic. We compare this deontic logic with Standard Deontic Logic and with more syntactically restricted logics

In Situ Corrosion Studies on the Battleship USS Arizona

U.S. National Park Service Submerged Resources Center archaeologists and University of Nebraska-Lincoln metallurgists are assessing hull corrosion by drilling through accumulated concretions and measuring pH and corrosion potentials. Concretion samples are being analyzed to determine the role of microbes in the corrosion process, identify chemical species, and measure electrical and physical properties. The lowest values of pH and E corr occur at the metal/concretion interface. Analysis suggests a variable corrosion rate supported by hydrogen discharge and/or oxygen reduction inside the concretion

On the algebraic structure of conditional events: 13th European conference, ECSQARU 2015, Compiègne, France, July 15-17, 2015.

This paper initiates an investigation of conditional measures as simple measures on conditional events. As a first step towards this end we investigate the construction of conditional algebras which allow us to distinguish between the logical properties of conditional events and those of the conditional measures which we can be attached to them. This distinction, we argue, helps us clarifying both concepts

Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism

This paper looks at whether it is possible to unify the requirements of rationality with the demands of normative reasons. It might seem impossible to do because one depends upon the agent’s perspective and the other upon features of the situation. Enter Reasons Perspectivism. Reasons perspectivists think they can show that rationality does consist in responding correctly to reasons by placing epistemic constraints on these reasons. They think that if normative reasons are subject to the right epistemic constraints, rational requirements will correspond to the demands generated by normative reasons. While this proposal is prima facie plausible, it cannot ultimately unify reasons and rationality. There is no epistemic constraint that can do what reasons perspectivists would need it to do. Some constraints are too strict. The rest are too slack. This points to a general problem with the reasons-first program. Once we recognize that the agent’s epistemic position helps determine what she should do, we have to reject the idea that the features of the agent’s situation can help determine what we should do. Either rationality crowds out reasons and their demands or the reasons will make unreasonable demands

Safety, the Preface Paradox and Possible Worlds Semantics

This paper contains an argument to the effect that possible worlds semantics renders semantic knowledge impossible, no matter what ontological interpretation is given to possible worlds. The essential contention made is that possible worlds semantic knowledge is unsafe and this is shown by a parallel with the preface paradox